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PERSONAL PROPERTY-GIFTS-DELIVERY To THIRD PARTY-A husband 
changed the beneficiary of his life insurance policy from his wife to his 
mother during a temporary separation and failed to restore his wife as 
beneficiary after reconciliation. Subsequent to his death the mother, in the 
presence· of the wife, signed a memorandum "waiving" her policy rights 
"to" the wife and handed the writing to the insurer's district manager. 
Before payment of the proceeds the mother discovered that the wife was 
the beneficiary of another policy and attempted to revoke the memoran-
dum. In insurer's interpleader action, a gift to the wife was recognized. 
On appeal, held, affirmed. The memorandum signified the mother's rights, 
indicated her donative intent, and was delivered to the district manager 
as the representative of the wife. Smith v. Smith, (Mo. App. 1958) 313 S.W. 
(2d) 753. 
The rights of a life insurance beneficiary are fixed at the insured's 
death1 and constitute a chose in action2 which may be the subject of a 
gift.3 A valid gift requires, in addition to present donative intent, delivery 
1 VANCE, INSURANCE, 3d ed., §108, p. 680 (1951). 
2 Washington Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888). 
3 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §58, p. 183 (1955). 
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of the subject matter.4 The purpose of the delivery requirement is to 
impress the donor with the finality of his act and to provide objective 
evidence of donative intent which will demonstrate to other parties and 
facilitate proof by the donee that a gift has been made.I• 
Delivery to a third party accomplishes the desired purposes and com-
pletes the gift only if the intermediary is not said to represent the donor.6 
Where the status of the third party is not apparent,7 several cases have 
resolved the issue by applying some form of presumption as to repre-
sentation.8 More often various factors surrounding the delivery are ex-
amined. First, the clarity of present donative intent is investigated. Where 
evidence of intent is strong, as in the principal case, the courts are re-
luctant to defeat that intent by holding that the intermediary in fact 
represented the donor.9 Second, a stronger case for validity is presented 
where, as in the instant situation, the donee knew of the delivery to the 
third party. This knowledge is closely related to the existence of present 
donative intent.10 But, more important, such knowledge makes possible 
an otherwise unavailable agency analysis to explain the validity of the 
4 Id., §48, p. 129. 
5 See Mechem, "The Requirement of Delivery," 21 Iu.. L. REv. 341, 457, 568 (1926-
1927). Physical transfer of the res, the clearest act of delivery, is impossible where the 
subject of the gift is intangible. Consequently, transfer of a document symbolizing the 
rights of the donor completes the gift. Such documents include stock certificates, bonds, 
notes, bank books, insurance policies, etc. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §60, p. 
194 (1955). Symbolic delivery is usually limited to documents commercially regarded as 
evidencing the rights of the donor. In the setting of the principal case, such a document 
would be the insurance policy, which was already in the hands of the donee. Thus, 
delivery of the memorandum constituted the best delivery possible under the circum-
stances. See Otis v. Beckwith, 49 Ill. 121 (1868); Matter of Babcock, 147 N.Y.S. 168, 85 
Misc. 256 (1914); Dinslage v. Stratman, 105 Neb. 274, 180 N.W. 81 (1920). Alternatively 
the memorandum could be regarded as a deed of gift, despite its informality. See Matter 
of Cohn, 176 N.Y.S. 225, 187 App. Div. 392 (1919); Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185 (1875); 
Francoeur v. Beatty, 170 Cal. 740, 151 P. 123 (1915); 21 ILL. L. REv. 576-586 (1927). 
6 See Matter of Rainbow, 298 N.Y.S. 79, 163 Misc. 732 (1936); Dodson v. National 
Title Ins. Co., 159 Fla. 371, 31 S. (2d) 402 (1947). The purpose of delivery is not ac-
complished by delivery to the donor's representative: the donor is not impressed with the 
finality of his act because the present holder of the res is subject to his control; the only 
evidence of donative intent supports a gift to a party other than the donee; and the donee 
has nothing to substantiate his claim. 
7 Compare Baugh v. Howze, 211 Ark. 222, 199 S.W. (2d) 940 (1947) with Ammon v. 
Martin, 59 Ark. 191, 26 S.W. 826 (1894). Also see Szabo v. Speckman, 73 Fla. 374, 74 S, 
411 (1917). 
s Presuming the third party represents the donee: Kennedy v. Nelson, 125 Neb. 185, 
249 N.W. 546 (1933); Mollison v. Rittgers, 140 Iowa 365, 118 N.W. 512 (1908). Presuming 
the third party represents the donor: Chicago Bank v. Cohn, 197 Ill. App. 326 (1916); 
Clapper v. Frederick, 199 Pa. 609, 49 A. 218 (1901). 
9 See In re Weingart's Estate, (Mo. App. 1943) 170 S.W. (2d) 972; Phillips v. Plastridge, 
107 Vt. 267, 179 A. 157 (1935). Compare Horlocker v. Saunders, 59 Ohio App. 548, 18 
N.E. (2d) 994 (1938); Foulke v. Hickman, (Mo. App. 1924) 259 S.W. 496. 
10 If the donee does not know of the delivery, immediate enjoyment is unlikely and 
doubt is cast upon the present intention of the donor. 
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delivery to the intermediary.11 Third, the reason for delivery to the third 
party rather than the more conventional delivery directly to the donee 
merits consideration.12 In the principal case, anything given to the donee13 
would have been immediately handed to the district manager for com-
munication to the insurance company. Fourth, subsequent actions of the 
third party in response to attempted direction by the donor or the donee 
help to determine his status at the time of delivery.14 The fact that the 
manager accepted the revocation as readily as the waiver and that the 
insurance company thereupon filed a bill of interpleader rather than pay 
the proceeds either to the donee or to the donor points neither to donative 
intent nor its absence. Fifth, the status of the intermediary in other 
transactions with the donor or the donee may shed light upon his 
status in the delivery transaction.15 In the instant case, the absence of 
any prior relationship between the intermediary and either party made 
this consideration of no value to the court. Finally, the disposition of 
the res if the gift is held defective may assist the court in determining 
the status of the third party on an ad hoc basis.16 The result reached in 
11 The agency status of the third party is unique and not expected to conform to 
the general law of agency. However, the donee must know the third party exists and 
possesses the res if the third party is to be regarded as- the donee's agent. Where this 
knowledge exists, a valid delivery may be found on the familiar principle that possession 
of an agent is possession of the principal. Larkin v. McCabe, 211 Minn. 11, 299 N.W. 
649 (1941); In re Fitzpatrick's Estate, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 280 (1940). Excluding the possibilities 
of contract novation or third-party beneficiary analysis the only explanation for valid 
delivery where knowledge is absent is that the third party holds as trustee for the donee. 
Scoville v. Vail Investment Co., 55 Ariz. 486, 103 P. (2d) 662 (1940); Streeper v. Meyers, 
132 Ohio St. 332, 7 N.E. (2d) 554 (1937). The courts are understandably reluctant to 
apply such a theory since the layman seldom thinks in trust terms. Therefore where the 
donee has no knowledge of the delivery to the third party, there is a tendency to hold 
the gift incomplete. Matter of Lafler, 1 App. Div. (2d) 84, 147 N.Y.S. (2d) 211 (1955); 
Crowell v. Milligan, 157 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. (2d) 346 (1953). 
12 If the donor had a testamentary purpose in delivering to a third party the gift 
is invalid. In re Estate of Wright, 304 Ill. App. 87, 25 N.E. (2d) 909 (1940). Three common 
explanations for failure to deliver to the donee are (1) gift of part of a larger whole, 
Bond v. Bunting, 78 Pa. 210 (1875); (2) minor donee, In re Golos' Will, 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 625 
(1946); Martin v. -McCullough, 136 Ind. 331, 34 N.E. 819 (1893); (3) absent donee, Foster 
v. Rose, (Okla. 1951) 238 P. (2d) 332; Crystal v. Joerg, 16 N.J. Super. 514, 85 A. (2d) 218 
(1951). Without some explanation the gift is likely to be held incomplete. Rinehart v. 
Rinehart, 14 Ill. App. (2d) 116, 143 N.E. (2d) 398 (1957); In re Adams' Estate, 58 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 899 (1945); Merchant v. German Bldg. and Loan Co., 1 Ohio App. 47 (1913). 
13 The donee was already in possession of the policy. 
14See Cox v. Windham, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 10 S.W. (2d) 136 (third party accepts 
donee's direction, gift good); Chandler v. Roddy, 163 Tenn. 338, 43 S.W. (2d) 397 (1931) 
(third party accepts donor's direction, gift ineffective). 
15 See Sauls v. Whitman, 171 Okla. 113, 42 P. (2d) 275 (1935) (prior agent of donor, 
delivery ~neffective); Matter of Rainbow, note 6 supra (delivery to donor's attorney bad); 
In _re Will of Gordon, 238 Iowa 580, 27 N.W. (2d) 900 (1947) (third party also donee, 
dehvery good). 
16 See In re Fetzer's Estate, (Ohio App. 1940) 34 N.E. (2d) 306 (unequal distribution 
to children if gift invalid, equal distribution if valid, gift held effective); Gordon v. 
Clark, 149 Ark. 173, 232 S.W. 19 (1921) (no other disposition of property, gift held valid). 
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this case gives the insurance proceeds to the original beneficiary, the widow, 
in a situation where it is inferable that this was the probable intention 
of the donor. 
It should be clear, then, that the status of the third party becomes 
important only as a useful tool in determining whether the purposes of 
the delivery requirement have been satisfied. This ultimate question is 
best resolved through consideration of all the factors surrounding the 
delivery. An examination of these factors in the principal case indicates 
that there was conduct sufficient to establish donative intent and impress 
the donor with the finality of her act. 
Thomas A. Dieterich, S.Ed. 
